Slack Owner Transferred
Detect Slack workspace owner transfer events in Slack audit logs.
Query
Extract logs where the value of the event_name field matches owner_transferred, and extract entity.user.name into the target_user field.
| search event_name == "owner_transferred"
| eval target_user = valueof(valueof(entity, "user"), "name")
Message
- Slack owner transfer: domain $context_domain ($user_name ➜ $target_user)
Output field order
- _log_time, src_ip, context_type, context_name, user, user_name, user_email, event_name, entity, user_agent
Threat Analysis
- The Slack workspace Owner role has the highest level of administrative privileges, and an owner transfer (
owner_transferred) indicates a full transfer of control over the workspace. - If an attacker uses a compromised admin/owner account to transfer ownership to themselves or an accomplice account, they can achieve both persistence and privilege escalation.
- Once the attacker gains owner privileges, they can change security settings (SSO/MFA policies), access audit logs, install/approve apps, manage users/permissions, and expand data access—greatly increasing the risk of subsequent defense evasion and data exfiltration.
- Although this event can occur during legitimate administrative activity, it is typically rare and has very high impact, so it should be treated as a high-severity event.
False Positives
- Legitimate owner rotation due to organizational restructuring (team merges/splits, change of responsibility, etc.).
- Administrative handover procedures due to the previous owner leaving the company or changing roles.
- Owner transfer performed when an MSP/outsourced operator takes over workspace administration.
- Owner transfer to an operations administrator during the initial setup of a newly created workspace.
- Occurrences in test/pilot workspaces for validating administrative procedures.
Response Actions
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Immediate verification
- Confirm whether the initiator (
user_name) and the target (target_user) are approved workspace administrators in the organization. - Verify the reason for the change (ticket/approval/request records) and validate that it followed the proper process.
- Confirm whether the initiator (
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Urgent actions if suspicious
- If the transfer is unauthorized, immediately revert ownership and revoke any additional administrative privileges that may have been granted.
- For the involved accounts (initiator and target), force session termination, require password reset, re-enroll MFA, and review SSO/IdP logs.
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Additional hunting
- Correlate related events for the same user/IP, including recent login failures (
user_login_failed), anomalous logins, MFA/SSO setting changes, role/permission changes (permissions_assigned,role_change_to_owner), app installations/scope expansions (app_installed,app_scopes_expanded), and audit log searches (audit_logs_records_searched).
- Correlate related events for the same user/IP, including recent login failures (
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Prevention
- Require multi-party approval (two-person approval) or ticket-based authorization for any owner changes.
- Apply strong controls to owner accounts such as enforced MFA, SSO integration, minimizing the number of admin accounts, and privileged account separation (PAM).
MITRE ATT&CK
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Tactic
- Persistence, Privilege Escalation
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Technique
- Name: Account Manipulation
- ID: T1098
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/