AWS Console External Login
User logs in to the AWS console from an external location.
Query
Detects when the AWS CloudTrail audit log event name is ConsoleLogin
, the source IP address does not belong to the “internal network range,” and the authentication result is Success
.
| search event_name == "ConsoleLogin"
| matchnet guid="bb994ca4-1471-4b91-89f2-99a61bd529b5" field=src_ip invert=t
| eval outcome = valueof(resp_params, "ConsoleLogin")
| search outcome == "Success"
| rename account_id as cloud_account, aws_region as cloud_region
| lookup geoip src_ip output country as src_country, asn as src_asn
Message
- AWS console external login: Cloud $cloud_account, Region $cloud_region, Account $user, Access IP $src_ip ($src_asn)
Output field order
- _log_time, cloud_account, cloud_region, src_ip, src_country, src_asn, user, user_type, event_source, event_name, outcome, user_agent, error_message, additional_event_data, resp_params, tls_details
Threat Analysis
- The attacker may have obtained AWS console credentials of the company account through phishing, data leakage, or password reuse.
- A successful login event from an external network (IP, ASN, country) that is not the corporate intranet or VPN is judged to be a sign of initial access or re-entry (persistence) after intrusion through account takeover.
- The attacker can leverage the obtained privileges from an external location to manipulate cloud resources, exfiltrate data, escalate privileges, and disguise as a legitimate user, making detection difficult.
- Particularly, if detected on an administrator account, it could pose a critical threat to the organization’s entire cloud environment.
False Positive Types
- An administrator may legitimately log in to the AWS console from an external network while on a business trip, working from home, or on the move.
- If the VPN connection is unstable, an internal user may temporarily access via an external network as part of normal activity.
- Contractors or outsourced personnel may legitimately access with approved accounts from external networks.
- Access may also be detected as non-internal if it originates from public cloud proxies, CDNs, or mobile ISP environments.
Response Actions
- When a detection event occurs, immediately confirm with the account owner whether the login attempt was legitimate.
- Perform additional log analysis to check for simultaneous logins of the same account from different regions/ASNs, abnormal API calls, or privilege escalation attempts.
- If MFA is not enabled for AWS IAM users and the Root account, enforce it without delay.
- Use AWS IAM policies or IdP (SSO) conditional access to restrict console access only from the corporate intranet or VPN.
- Correlate detection of external successful login events with IAM changes, new access key issuance, EC2 operations, and data access attempts to monitor anomalies.
- If confirmed as unauthorized, immediately reset the account password, invalidate sessions, and revoke access keys if necessary.
MITRE ATT&CK
-
Tactics
- Defense Evasion, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access
-
Technique
- Name: Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
- ID: T1078.004
- Reference URL: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004/